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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce the WorkSim model, a novel agent-based framework to study
labor markets. The first objective of the model is to reproduce the gross flows between the important
states: employment (distinguishing fixed term contracts and open ended contracts), unemployment
and inactivity, and the ratios of individuals in these states. The novelty of the model is that it
simulates the flows on the basis of the rational decisions of individual heterogeneous agents. Once
the model is calibrated, the second objective is to characterize the nature of the labor market
under study. This is done, first by examining the patterns of flows and stocks at the aggregate level
and at the levels of different categories of labor, and second by sensitivity experiments, modifying
some exogenous parameters and variables such as the demand for the good. Finally the model once
calibrated is a tool for experimenting labor market policies, including changes in the labor law in
France.
1 Introduction
WorkSim is a novel agent-based framework to study labor markets. The multi-agent
methodology is the perfect tool for such a research program, since it can model insti-
tutions precisely, and account for heterogeneity and individual interactions. Simulation
results enable us to compute aggregate variables such as the flows and the stocks, and
finally the individual careers and the main types of trajectories.
Agents are autonomous and there is then no need for an auctioneer, an unrealistic
fiction in orthodox models, and this is has consequences since the labor market is very
decentralized. The agents take decisions based on their information and the calculation
of costs and benefits, and the profit (for the firms) or utility (for the individuals) they
expect. The environment is very complex because of the institutions and the interactions,
and changing, and their rationality is bounded in the sense of Simon (1956). Therefore,
when in a given state, they choose the best of a few possible solutions (see below for
examples). They make mistakes when deciding, but in WorkSim, they can learn and
revise their requirements. The institutions and legal rules that constrain the decisions are
modeled precisely. The model allows for non-linear relations between aggregate variables,
and notably crowding-out effects, often important in labor markets. The computed effects
of the present law will bring a resounding example. These models can be calibrated with
a varying degree of sophistication, and when the purpose is to study a policy, as in this
paper, it is an essential part of the research.
1.1 Extending Search Theory
WorkSim is grounded in the concept of search (Phelps, 1970). Search Theory studies how
economic actors find a partner for their transactions (here a company with a job)5. In
WorkSim the basic concept of search is extended in three directions, in order to build a
general theory of mobility :
1. Search is done also by firms that symmetrically look for workers who are high in
the productivity distribution. They prefer to keep a job vacant than hire a worker
with a poor productivity. A stopping rule taking the form of a minimum productivity
requirement or hiring standard follows. Moreover, the addition of the costs of search
may render the job unprofitable (and then it will be suppressed).
2. The search calculus is extended to all voluntary decisions by workers such as quits and
on-the-job search (i.e. looking for a new job while remaining employed). The firms take
into account the search costs of replacement when they consider firing a worker, for lack
of productivity. Finally the hiring decision is the result of the sequential decisions of
the worker who applies and the firm which selects and hires. Moreover, unlike matching
models, we do not use any matching function – like in the canonical model of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) – as it is an aggregate artifact, likely not to be robust to large
changes in the labor market, and with weaker microeconomic foundations than our
double search decision6.
3. Our model integrates wage rigidities7 with the realistic assumption that firms have
often several jobs. It allows for the differentiation between demand shocks and produc-
tivity shocks, while existing search models do not often deal with this topic.The model
then contains some Keynesian features. Demand shocks explain part-time, dismissals,
and job creations in the model, while productivity changes explain dismissals, promo-
tions and some hires. This distinction has also some importance since the model deals
only with the labor market, with no feedback on the goods market. The demand for
the goods is exogenous. To make things simple and coherent, we assume that each firm
produces a variety of a unique good with horizontal differentiation, and hence a unique
exogenous price. However, Each firm faces stochastic shocks on its demand, which can
be seen as fluctuations of consumers’ preferences.
However a major difference between WorkSim and the analytical search models relies on
our utilization of the concept of Simon’s bounded rationality to model the decisions
(Simon, 1955). Two major arguments can be given:
5 The search concept is necessary to distinguish the two states of “unemployed” and “inactive” on the basis of
rational decisions of agents. There is indeed a flow from unemployment to inactivity, because the value in terms
of unemployment utility (expected gains from search minus time foregone) may become lower than the utility
of inactivity (including welfare and free time). In that case, the individual stops search and becomes inactive.
This is distinct from the fact that part of the inactive persons do not want to work because they have some
other resources and value non-working time (caring for children)
6 For evidence of the bias introduced by a matching function as a result of an employment policy, see (Neugart,
2008).
7 The wages are rigid because it is usually difficult for a firm to reduce wages, due to labor agreements, fears for
lost productivity or competition with other firms to hire employees.
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1. First, dynamic programming algorithms used to solve the decision problem in ana-
lytical search theory cannot be used in a model in which heterogeneous agents move
sequentially into many states over time and compete.
2. Second, according to bounded rationality theory, real agents have limited capacities in
terms of computation and memory. They might therefore use simple rules, but a very
important behavioral addition in our approach is that they can revise their decisions
or even their rules thanks to learning and collecting information. This continuous
learning is in fact very coherent with search theory. However, in order to compute
equilibrium, analytical models assume perfect rationality and individuals have a lot
of information such as the true distribution of wages, and firms the true distribution
of productivities. By contrast, in WorkSim, we model “simple” decision rules - that
comply with bounded rationality, partial information and learning processes.
1.2 Related Agent-based models
The contributions to the multi-agent literature on labor markets must also be assessed.
This literature is thin but has a long history. Bergmann (1974) has developed a simple
search model by both sides of the market and obtained simultaneously vacant jobs and
unemployment. Eliasson (1977) built a Keynesian and Schumpeterian micro-to-macro
model which treats only firms as individual agents but the number of workers in a firm
can vary and unemployment is computed. ARTEMIS (Ballot, 1981, 2002) , the ancestor
of WorkSim, is the first multi-agent model to have modeled the gross flows between the
three main states of the individuals, with the addition of on-the-job search as a state. This
was also done within an institutional framework, notably with a temporary help firm, and
firing costs. The model generates a temporary segmentation of the young workers. Then,
a negative demand shock affects very differently the categories of labor, precluding the
progressive integration of young workers in the internal labor markets. This will lead to a
permanent segmentation with serious life cycle consequences.
The years 2000 have mainly seen multi-agents models aiming at theoretical research
(see Neugart et al. (2012) for a recent review), such as introducing networks, a logical way
to consider search in some contexts (Tassier and Menczer, 2001). Richiardi (2004) modeled
the matching process between workers and firms with on-the- job search, entrepreneurial
decisions and endogenous wage determination. Neugart (2008) developed an agent-based
labor market model with sector-specific skill requirements. Barlet et al. (2009) simulate
the French labor market for year 2006. They distinguish individuals and jobs, but not
firms as such although there is labor demand side, with creations and destructions of jobs
based on a desired margin and demand.
WorkSim goes beyond the existing multi-agent literature on the labor markets in three
directions:
1. It is the only ABM labor model to be grounded in a double stock-flow accounting,
one for the individuals, one for the jobs, and most of the important flows are consid-
ered. This accounting is the equivalent of the financial stock-flow accounting for ACE
macroeconomic models, a guarantee of coherence. It also allows for a easy description
3
of the labor market dynamics at the aggregate and any disaggregation level of inter-
est, and the highlighting of the competition between categories of labor (young, adults,
seniors....).
2. It models the institutions and the labor law at their level of direct impact (the
microeconomic level), since they are rules of the game that agents know and take into
account in their decisions. The diverse forms of labor contracts, with very extreme
differences, are probably the major feature of the French labor market, and they are
at the heart of the model, since they modify the flows 8.
3. As stated above,most of the gross flows are generated by bounded rational deci-
sions based on an enlarged search theory, and the effects of shocks we will study then
integrate the agents responses and interactions within the rules of the game and the ac-
counting constraints. Our multi-agent model then provides a tool to explore rigorously
the complex system constituted by the labor market.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the main features of the
model. In section 3, we present our validation method – through calibration – and in
section 4 some simulation results. We will show how WorkSim could be used to assess
labor policies, including the recent “Labor Law” that attracted most of the attention
recently in France, and generated vivid debates among policians, and economists. Section
5 will conclude and open the discussion.
Note that if the current version WorkSim is primarily designed to account for the
French Labor Market (denoted FLM in this paper), most of its components and mecha-
nisms could be re-used to describe labor markets in other countries. In fact, mainly the
elements specific to the French institutions (labor law) must be adapted when dealing
with another country.
2 Model Description
2.1 The agents in WorkSim
There are two types of agents: Private Firms and Individuals. At its creation, each firm
starts with at least one worker to run the company, representing the managing director 9
The Individuals are grouped in households and the simulation evolves in a closed popula-
tion. The individuals can marry each other, have children, and therefore the decisions of
one member of the household may have an impact on the other members. In WorkSim,
the agents are heterogeneous. They have specific attributes determined once and for all
at their creation (e.g. gender, amenity, ...) and internal variables (e.g. age, salary, number
of employees, ...) that evolve all along the simulation.
The agents under 15 or over 65 years belong to these households but are not instanti-
ated as full agents and do not take decisions in the model. However, these non-instantiated
8 The diversity of contracts exists in many other countries and our model could be adapted to simulate other
labor markets.
9 The managing director works full time for the firm, and at the three occupations. The director never leaves
the firm, except to retire or when the firm goes bankrupt.
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agents indirectly participate through the economic decisions of the other members of the
household (eg. the number of dependent children is taken into account in decisions of
transition to inactivity, the retirement pension is included in household income). The
individuals under 15 years become full agents in the model at the age of 15, and some
remain in the school system while others enter the labor market.
2.2 Environment
In addition to these agents, the model uses three artifacts 10:
– JobAds, which receives job offers from the firms and job applications from the job
seekers. Dissemination of information, however, is based on the job search process
described in more detail below (see sections 2.8 and 2.9), according to the principles
of search theory.
– a Statistical Institute that calculates statistics from the simulation and disseminates
some information (e.g. tension on the labor market). The information is imperfect for
agents, and we specify what information is being broadcasted.
– a Public Sector that recruits (exogenously) employees, collects payroll taxes on busi-
nesses.
2.3 Institutional Framework
Moreover, it also includes one institutional module. One distinctive feature of the WorkSim
model is to integrate a fairly complete and flexible institutional framework that includes
(1) the necessary elements of the French labor Law, including two types of contract:
Fixed-Term contracts (FTC11) and open ended contracts (OEC12), dismissals on personal
and on economic grounds, redundancy payments, . . . ). and (2) government decisions
(minimum wages, welfare benefits, ...).
2.4 Individuals
In WorkSim, the individuals i are characterized by the following attributes :
– Gender : female or male.
– Age, denoted agei and counted in weeks (a tick represents one week in the simulation).
– Preferences for free time : see section 2.9 below.
– State in the labor market. The possible states are : inactive, unemployed, employed
and not searching for another job (denoted ENS), employed and seeking a new job
(denoted OTJS, for On-The-Job Searchers), student or retired.
10 Artifacts in multi-agent systems are the passive (non-proactive) entities providing the services and functions
that make individual agents work together (Omicini et al., 2008), and must be distinguished from proactive
autonomous entities like the individuals or the firms.
11 Main FTC (CDD) Features: maximum duration of 18 months including the possibility to be renewed once,
small probationary period, allowance at the end of the contract: 10 % of total gross salary. Cannot be broken
without heavy penalties (paying the remaining salary part).
12 Main OEC (CDI) Features: no duration limit, probationary period, no firing costs for the first year, no termi-
nation costs if quitting, variable firing costs when firing.
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– Occupation, denoted q in this chapter. The number of possible occupations is denoted
nq. In our simulations, we consider 3 levels : 1=blue collar or employee, 2 = middle
level job, 3 = executive. Of course, an individual can change his/her occupation during
the simulation (upward or downward).
– Productivity kernel kProdi : it represents the “innate” abilities of the individual i.
kProdi ∼ Max(0, N (1, σcoreProd))13 with standard deviation σcoreProd ∈ [0, 1] is an
exogenous calibrated parameter.
– Condition factor condi, t that represents the physical condition, the motivation and
satisfaction for i. It evolves with time following a random walk :
condi,t+1 =Max(minC, Min(maxC, condi,t +N (1, σC))) (1)
Hence ∀t, condi,t ∈ [minC, maxC]. minC et maxC are two exogenous parameters
and σC ∈ [0, 0.3] is calibrated.
– Human capitals (HC) HCgeni,t , HCocci,q,t, HC
spec
i,p,t , respectively for the general, related to
the occupational level q, and specific to the firm and job p human capitals14.
The general HC represents the abilities useful for all jobs, like problem solving or
knowledge of a foreign language. It increases with experience (one more unit per tick)
and also with training. It decreases at each tick i is unemployed by a percentage Lxp
after Txp ticks (loss of skills). Lxp ∈ [0, 0.1] and Txp ∈ [0, 100] are two calibrated
parameters.
The occupational HC is related to the occupational level, and represents abilities spe-
cific to this level: machinery or team leading for instance. Like the general HC, it
increases with experience (one more unit per tick) and also with training, and de-
creases at each tick i is unemployed by a percentage Lxp after Txp ticks.
The specific HC is related to the position and the firm. It represents abilities specific to
the job in the firm, like a particular process or a software to use. It equals the number
of ticks the employee spends in the job. It is reset to zero when s/he leaves the job.
2.5 Demand
The only production factor is the labor, like in many labor market models. There is
one good, and each firm produces a certain amount of its own variety of this good. The
price P is then unique (horizontal differentiation) and fixed at the arbitrary value of 1.
Each firm of the N firms in our model responds to a quantity demanded of this good Dj,t,
which fluctuates randomly due to variations in consumers preferences. However, the global
demand Dtot is held constant because we aim to study our economy in a steady state.
At time t = 0, the market share of a firm j is given by Dj,t=0/Dtot. We assume that
the distribution of this global demand varies between firms. Then we apply a stochastic
shock on this market share for each firm at each period (random walk) using a normal
law.
13 In this chapter, N (µ, σ) denotes a normal law distribution, with mean µ and standard deviation σ.
14 There are many evidences that support all these three types of human capitals (e.g. Kambourov and Manovskii,
2009; Crook et al., 2011).
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2.6 Jobs
Each firm has a managing director and a list of jobs per occupation. A job can be in 3
different states : filled, vacant or pending. A pending job is typically an FTC contract
that ended, but cannot be renewed immediately, because of the waiting period15.
Each job p of the occupation q is characterized by specific attributes determined once
for all at its creation :
– a vector of required human capitals [HCgenreq,p, HCoccreq,p,q, HCspecreq,p], respectively for the
general, related to the occupational level q, and specific to the firm and job p hu-
man capitals. They represent the minimum skills required to work on this job and
are randomly drawn according to uniform distributions respectively between 0 and
MaxHCgenreq , MaxHCoccreqand MaxHCspecreq . We will see in the next section that an indi-
vidual can acquire these skills with experience and training.
– The duration of work HpWp, measured by the number of hours required per week for
the job p.
– A hourly base production QHbasej,q that equals to the hourly base production for all
jobs in the firm at occupation q. It is randomly drawn at the creation of the firm
j, to account for the differences in production efficiency (technology, organization...)
between the firms.
– A hourly base salary determined from the base production in the job for all jobs in the
firm at occupation q :
SHbasej,q = QH
base
j,q × P × (1− ζ) (2)
with P = 1 the exogenous price of the (unique) good and ζ ∈ [0, 1], an exogenous
parameter that represents the share of the base productivity value kept by the firm (in
order to pay expenses, taxes, interests, dividends, etc.). The weekly base salary will be
simply given by
Sbasej,p,q = SH
base
j,q ×HpWp (3)
– A level of amenity. This represents non-monetary features perceived by the individual
on the job (social recognition, working environment,...). A hourly base amenity ran-
domly drawn at the creation of the firm as a percentage PrA of the base salary for all
occupation level q.
2.7 Simulation cycle in the WorkSim Model
The simulation cycle includes four main steps, as shown in Figure 1 below:
1. Firm decisions: contracts and vacancies management, evaluations, job creation / de-
struction;
2. Individual decisions: labor market entrances and exits, job search;
3. Firm decisions: applications and promotions management;
4. Demography: household dynamics, retirements, aging.
15 The firm does not want to destroy the job, if there is still a potential demand margin for it, so it becomes a
pending job, until the waiting period will be finished. So we have here an important feature of WorkSim: unlike
other models, we distinguish the job and the contract, several employees (and therefore several contracts) may
have occupied the same job since its creation.
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Fig. 1: The simulation cycle in WorkSim
The length of one period in the simulation cycle corresponds to one week in the real world,
in order to take into account the many very short term contracts that are found in the
French labor market, 46% of all hires are on Fixed-Term Contracts that last one week or
less in 2010 (ACOSS, 2011).
2.8 Firm decisions
Before describing the job creation process, we describe the demand anticipation mecha-
nism that is the core of these job creation process and the endogenous choice between the
different contracts : FTC and OEC.
Demand anticipation The central idea that governs job creation relies on the way the firm
will estimate the future demand. If the demand is going to increase, a new job might be
profitable, but not if there is a decrease in the demand.
Hence, the firm will compute three scenarios – pessimistic, neutral and optimistic,
which are depicted in the Figure 2 below. We see in this Figure that in the pessimistic
scenario of demand evolution, the demand of the firm is below its production with the
new job after a certain time. As the firm cannot sell more good than its demand, it may
result in a loss because the firm has to continue to pay a salary. In this example, we see
that it may be more profitable for the firm to choose a contract with a shorter expected
duration like a 3 months FTC. Indeed, the firm will have the option to end this contract
after 3 months in case of a negative scenario or to renew it if it goes well. However with
a shorter contract it is more difficult to amortize the cost of hiring and training a new
employee. It therefore appears a trade-off depending on the level of uncertainty of future
demand and how the firm perceives the risks.
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Note that, because of bounded rationality, the firms anticipates with a finite horizon
only. Moreover, the decision process will combine all the three possible scenario into a
multi-criteria weighted utility, and the weight of each scenario is automatically calibrated.
Fig. 2: Demand and risk anticipation of the firms
Job creations (step 1 in Figure 1) The job creation proceeds in three steps:
1. First, the firm checks if there is a sufficient demand margin to create a new job.
Here it considers the actual (not anticipated) demand margin DMj,q,t for firm j and
occupation level q at time t: if it exceeds the demand margin threshold DT (calibrated
parameter), then the firm moves to the next step. Otherwise, no job is created.
2. If there is in the firm a pending job in the occupation q, the firm considers to hire a
new person for this job (taking into account the eventual waiting period). Therefore
the pending job becomes a vacant job. Otherwise, it moves to the next step.
3. Here, DMj,q,t > DT and there are no pending jobs in occupation q. Hence, the firm
considers to create a new job p of the occupation q. The characteristics of this new
job are randomly drawn. From these job features, the firm must decide which type of
contract suits better.
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Evaluation of a contract
1. During a prospecting phase, the firm receives information about NPros job seekers of
the occupation q , who have applied to a job with a FTC and NPros job seekers of
the occupation q who have applied to a job with a OEC during the last period. The
expected profit per period φperi,j,p,q,c,t for a candidate i on a job p with a contract c is then
computed for each contract : the OEC contract is compared with several FTC with
different fixed terms : 1 week, 1 month, 2 months, 6 months, 12 months, 18 months.
2. Then the firm chooses to create the contract c with the best average positive profit,
calculated along a set of potential candidates. These candidates are unemployed job
seekers and JobAds sends to the firm their productivity level and human capitals. The
firm will choose the contract c∗ that give the highest positive profit φavg. If all the
profits are negative, no new job is created.
3. The firm continues to consider creating new job as long as DMj,q,t > DT .
Job destruction (step 2 in Figure 1) By contrast, when there is a significant reduction
in its demand in one occupation (in our model, this is when DMj,q,t < −DT ), the firm
reacts in the short-term by trying to remove its vacancies. In the medium run (on a yearly
basis), if this low cost adjustment is not sufficient, the firm considers the possibility to
dismiss workers.
Moreover, independently of the demand level, the vacancies that remain unfilled and
have a vacancy duration greater than a fixed threshold – a parameter that will differ for
FTC and OEC – are destroyed.
Economic dismissals An evaluation of the financial viability of the company is performed
on a yearly basis (52 periods in the simulation). The first date of the balance sheet is drawn
randomly, then this financial reporting occurs every year from this date. The company
calculates its yearly return that is computed as the ratio of the yearly profit over the total
labor cost16. If this return falls below a certain profitability threshold (a fixed parameter
PT , that will be calibrated), the firm can justify an economic dismissal procedure:
– All remaining vacancies are removed.
– After all the vacancies being removed, if DMj,q,t < −DT still holds, the firm consider
to dismiss employees. It selects one employee, computes the associated profit Φtoti,j,p,q,c,t
and the firing cost EFC. If Φtoti,j,p,q,c,t < −EFC, the firm dismiss the employee. This
process is repeated until DMj,q,t > −DT or if all employees have been evaluated.
If a company has no employee anymore, and if the managing director left alone does not
make a sufficient return, the firm is considered to be bankrupt and is removed from the
simulation. The managing director becomes unemployed. However, we want to keep the
number of firms constant17. Hence, when a bankruptcy has occurred, we randomly select
16 The labor cost represents here the capital funds the firm has to pay in advance. Hence, the return is the ratio
of the profit over this capital.
17 We keep the number of firms constant for two main reasons. First, we do not aim to model the process of firm
creation, way too complex and out of the scope of WorkSim. Second, we are looking for a steady-state with a
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an active agent in the simulation to create a new firm and manage it. S/he will be the
only producer in the firm (until s/he starts to recruit).
Employee evaluations (step 3 in Figure 1) In each period, the firm examines if some
employees have to be evaluated. This individual evaluation may occur:
1. At the end of the probationary period for FTC and OEC ;
2. Every year, at the anniversary date of the contract, for OEC employee.
3. At the end of FTC contract to decide if it should be renewed ;
4. At the end of FTC contract, if the transformation of FTC to OEC is to be considered.
Dismissal for personal reasons The process takes in two steps :
1. First, the firm evaluates if there is a case for considering the dismissal. That could
be the case if the employee’s production is below the firm’s requirement. Thus, there
is a chance that the firm considers to fire this employee for personal reasons if the
annual production of the employee Qevali,j,p,q,t satisfies : Qevali,j,p,q,t < ρ × Qrequiredp,q where
Qrequiredp,q is the required level of production and ρ an exogenous parameter in [0.7, 0.9].
ρ encodes the tolerance the firm has with underproduction, or the maximum margin
risk it accepts to take18.
2. Then the firm decides whether such a dismissal is profitable (on economic grounds).
Hiring phase and promotions (step 7-8 in Figure 1) Once the firm has chosen
which contract c to create, a hiring norm must be computed to evaluate the candidates.
This hiring norm is the profitability threshold below which it prefers to refuse a candidate.
To do so, it uses the positive expected profits Φavgj,p,q,c,t calculated for each of the NPros
candidates during the prospecting phase and compute the average ΦMoy, the minimum
ΦMin and the maximum ΦMax values.
The hiring norm of the firm is given by:
HNormj,p,q,t=crea = (φ
per
Moy +N1 × (φ
per
Max − φ
per
Min))
N(dc)
H(TIGHq,t=crea)
(4)
– N1 will be calibrated in [0, 1]. The hiring norm increases with φperMax−φ
per
Min, so the firm
favors a large dispersion of candidates’ qualities in order to increase the probability to
get better candidates, as prescribed by search theory.
– N(dc) = N2+N3×dc, an increasing function of the duration of the contract dc proposed
for the job. N2 et N3 are two calibrated parameters in [0, 1]. We assume that the firm
will be more demanding for longer contracts, as they imply to keep the employee for
a longer time.
scale-up for year 2011, to apply and assess policies, and this will not be possible if the number of firms evolves
constantly.
18 If ρ is too high, it will create a lot of firings and the firm will have a higher chance to face trials and higher
chance to loose if it underestimated the real employee’s productivity.
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– TIGHq, t = crea is the tightness on the labor market at the time of job creation and
is given by TIGHq, t = Vq,t
Uq,t
with Vq,t the vacancy rate and Uq,t the unemployment rate
at time t for the occupation q. The higher this tension, the more the firms have to
lower their requirements if they hope to find a candidate. H is a logistic function with
values between 0.8 and 1.2 and given by H(x) = 0.8 + 0.4
1+20×e−3x .
This hiring norm is then decreased by a percentage N4 in each period until the job is
filled, but never drops below 0.
Hiring takes place in three steps:
1. Receiving applications – The firm receives applications from external and internal
applicants.
2. Selection and potential hiring – A two-steps process takes place:
(a) First, the firm computes a score for each candidate (internal or external), given by
the expected profit per period Φperi,j,p,q,c,t. Then the best candidate (highest score) is
selected.
(b) Thereafter, the firm checks if this candidate exceeds the hiring norm. If this is the
case, the candidate is hired, otherwise, the job remains vacant.
3. Internal promotion – If the best candidate hired is an internal candidate of the com-
pany, it is a promotion. The employee acquires the occupation level of the job.
2.9 Individual decisions (step 4-6 in Figure 1)
The individuals take decisions in each period of the simulation. This decision process
is modeled with a state machine, where one individual will be in one particular state:
inactive, unemployed, employed and not searching for another job, employed and seeking
a new job , student or retired. The transitions between these states can be caused by
individual choices (for example: to look for a job, to quit a job...), by external events
(firing, death...), or eventually by a sequence of multiple decisions (e.g. applying for a job,
and the firm hires the candidate).
Utility functions Each individual uses a utility function, to decide whether s/he should
stay in her/his current state or move to another one. The utility function has the generic
form of a Cobb-Douglas function:
U = (Income+ Amenity + Stability)1−α(Free T ime)α (5)
It is a weighted aggregation of four factors:
1. Income: weekly income of the household in euros, divided by the number of consump-
tion units (an adult counts for 1, a child 0.5)
2. Amenity : non-monetary features perceived by the individual (social recognition, work-
ing environment, job hardness...), cf. section 2.6 above.
3. Stability : criteria reflecting the preference of the individual for stability, i.e. for a job
with the long contract duration. The maximum value is given for a permanent job
(OEC). This stability is converted here into a percentage of salary and is expressed in
euros;
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4. Free time: free time per week available for the individual outside her/his working
hours and search time. Our definition is a broad one since it includes time devoted for
instance to sleep, eating, washing, domestic duties, and notably caring for the children.
The parameter αi,t ∈ [0, 1] encodes the preference of the individual for free time or work.
Overview of the individual decisions The decision-making process of individuals is
sequential and summed up in the state transition diagram depicted in Figure 3. At each
tick, the individual agent computes the utility of its current state and the utilities of each
reachable state. Each utility is evaluated using the generic form given by equation 5 above,
and instantiated with the relevant values of income, amenity, stability and free time. For
some transitions, a factor ICHANG ∈ [1, 2] is applied that represent the psychological
cost facing change (calibrated parameter). When ICHANG > 1, the new state’s utility
must be even greater to win the decision.
Fig. 3: UML State diagram describing the main transitions of individuals and their
decision-making process. UTTINA: utility to be inactive. UTNEW: utility of a new job,
estimated through prospecting. UTUEM: utility to be unemployed. UTRES: utility of
reservation. UTOJS: utility of the OJS (On-the-Job-Search) state. UTEMP: utility to be
employed. UTQUI: utility to quit. ICHANG psychological cost to change state (calibrated
exogenous parameter). EMPLOY measures the employability of the inactive. Dotted ar-
rows represent decisions that do not fully depend on the agent (i.e. taken by the firm.)
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Job search process After describing the different decision mechanisms, let me now
detail the overall job search process:
1. Each period in the model (one week in the reality), a job seeker receives from JobAds
a list of NVi,t vacancies matching her occupation or a level above. We assume that
these incoming job offers occur at a mean frequency that is known and independent
of the time elapsed since the last offer. Therefore, we model the incoming of new job
offers with a Poisson law : at time t, this number of vacancies NVi,t is drawn from a
Poisson distribution with parameter λt = NSJU × H(TIGHq,t), where NSJU is the
average number of vacancies received by the unemployed at each period, and H is the
same function of tightness as above.
2. The individual sends an application for the first offer whose utility is above his/her
reservation utility UTRESi,t19. If theres is no job offer corresponding to her/his oc-
cupation or if all of her/his applications are rejected, s/he lowers her/his reservation
utility UTRESi,t. Thus, at the end of each period, the reservation utility is updated :
UTRESi,t = UTRESi,t−1 × (1−Ru3) +Ru4 × (UTUEMi,t − UTUEMi,t−1) (6)
where Ru3 ∈ [0, 0.005] is a calibrated parameter and Ru4 a fixed parameter (0.5).
The first term of the equation accounts for the diminution with time and the second
is driven by a modification of UTUEM , that is the utility for the unemployed (for
instance a decrease of revenue will lower UTUEM and therefore UTRES, as the urge
to find the job increases).
3 Validation process
3.1 Methodology
The WorkSim methodology uses a validation process at 2 levels :
1. model building : the way we design the model, and especially the agents’ decision rules is
rooted as much as possible in empirical data and facts. Following the psychomimetism
methodology Kant (1999), we ensure that these decision processes do not violate the
cognitive principles we build our model from (e.g. bounded rationality).
2. data reproduction. We want our simulation to account for most of available data on the
labor market we aim to study. To do so, we use an automatic procedure to calibrate
the model parameters for which we don’t have an empirical value (see below).
3.2 Calibration
Scaling First of all, we must set the number of agents in the simulation. It must be
large enough to account sufficiently for real behaviors, but not exceed our computational
19 Reservation utility is an important concept in labor economics. It is the equivalent of the hiring norm, for the
individual, as it represents the minimum level of utility to make it acceptable to an agent. It does not remain
constant, but dynamically evolves during the agent’s life, to adapt to situation changes. So, the equation will
vary, depending on the agent’s state (see eq. 6).
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power20. For the first set of experiments (sections 4.1 and 4.2), we used a reduction factor
around 5400 and obtained 7484 individuals and 797 firm agents, for a total of 8281 agents
in the simulation. The simulation of the “Labor Law” required 20 000 agents to ensure we
have sufficient large firms (see section 4.3 below).
Calibration procedure To calibrate the 60 model parameters, we have to minimize a fitness
function that is the weighted sum of the relative spreads between the outputs of our model
and the real targets of the French labor market in 2011 (source: INSEE/DARES). We have
chosen 63 targets grouped in 10 different categories : unemployment rates (7 targets),
activity rates (6), salaries (14), job flows (12), FTC (4), long-term unemployment (3),
mobility (between occupations; 12), additional (part-time, vacancies, on-the-job,training
costs). In most cases, we have a target per occupation or age range.
To minimize this fitness function, we apply the evolutionary algorithm CMA-ES (Hansen
and Ostermeier, 2001), which is one of the most powerful algorithms to solve this kind
of problem (Auger and Hansen, 2012). CMA-ES means Covariance Matrix Adaptation
Evolution Strategy. The principle of this evolutionary algorithm is to test step by step
new generations of points in the parameters space. Each new generation of points is drawn
stochastically according to the results obtained with the previous generation of points.
The mean and the covariance matrix of the distribution of the new randomly drawn points
are updated incrementally in order to move towards the best results obtained by previous
generations.
At each iteration, the CMA-ES algorithm sets the values of all the 60 parameters.
Then, to cope with the stochasticity we have in the model, 48 simulations are run (they
are usually called replications in a calibration process) with a different seed for the random
generator, and the outputs are averaged over these 48 simulations to obtain the fitness
value of the iteration. We stop the calibration when the fitness does not improve (same
minimum value) for 500 iterations.
Computational power needs The calibration process is very costly in terms of computa-
tional resources, because the total number of simulations could be very high : it is given
by the product of the number of iterations by the number of replications. With Work-
Sim, it took 2000 iterations to converge, and as stated above each iteration is made of 48
replications. Each simulation takes about 1-2 minutes overall and the whole calibration
process will take a couple of days to be completed.
Results of the calibration on the main targets We obtain an average relative spread between
all the outputs of our model and the real targets of 7.9 %. This can be deemed satisfactory
for such a large non-linear model. We deal with a multi-objective optimization problem
with many targets and parameters, and these problems are known to be hard to solve.
20 As we show below, the simulation itself does not take too much time and power to run. The critical point is
the calibration as it has to launch thousands of simulations to reach an acceptable solution.
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4 Simulation analyses and results
In this section, we summarize the main results from a first set of prior simulations we
conducted with WorkSim. In this set, the model was calibrated to account French data in
2011. And then we present results on the most recent labor law reform in France. Note
that each simulation result is averaged over 196 simulations.
4.1 Characterizing the French Labor Market
The model generates some important specific characteristics of the French Labor Market
such as the very important share of FTCs in terms of flows, 81 % and the contrasting
fairly low figure of the share of the workers employed in such contracts: only 9 %. The
unemployment of the young is also much higher than the unemployment of the older
workers. This confirms the dualism in the French Labor Market, which is displayed by
the differences in the patterns of gross flows of the categories of workers. The model
computes all the simulated flows, but allows for comparison with those which can be
measured by the published statistics, and the results fit roughly. Most workers are stable
in their OECs, while a minority undergoes short spells of employment in FTCs and spells
of unemployment between them. Moreover this dualism persists for part of the young
workers when they age while the others obtain more stable OEC. More novel results are
obtained but will not be detailed here, since they are not the core of this paper.
4.2 Assessment of some labor public policies
We conducted several simulation of labor policies, and most of them were new (never
implemented). In fact, one of the major purpose of WorkSim is to aid politic decision
on employment and labor, by simulating and understanding the effects of one particular
policy.
Removal of Fixed-Term contracts Because of the strong segmentation in the French
Labor market, with a lot of flows between FTC and unemployment and very few to enter
into a more stable OEC, one might want to permanently remove the FTC and have only
OEC contracts. We experimented this removal in WorkSim, where only OEC and few cus-
tomary FTC contracts remained. We measured the impact after 2 and 4 years. Two years
after the removal, there is a significant rise of the unemployment rate (+1.1), especially
among young people and employees or workers. After 4 ans, the unemployment rate de-
creases, and equals the baseline simulation (with FTC), because part of the individuals get
hired on a OEC. But the unemployment rate decreases also because of the discouragement
of 390 000 that leave the labor market (the activity rate drops by 1 point). More over,
the long-term unemployment strongly increases (29 points after 2 ans, and still 24 points
more after 4 years). Thus, not only the abolition of FTC failed to reduce the segmentation
but it actually increased it21. FTC and OEC are not substitutable but complementary.
21 There are several processes involved in FTCs, and they have opposing consequences on unemployment: buffer-
stock, screening, experience and stepping stone are more likely to have a positive effect, while churning (the
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Reduction of charges The level of social charges on employment are frequently dis-
cussed, especially by employers’ syndicates. In fact, in 2003, the minister F. Fillon has
passed a law that reduces the charges paid by the firms on employment, for salaries lower
than 1.6 times the minimum wage (SMIC). The decrease will be 26 % for firms with 20
employees or more, and 28.1 % for the others. To study the effect of this measure, we com-
pared the results of the baseline simulation22 with a new simulation where these charge
reductions are removed. We measured a drop of 0.72 points in unemployment rate, and a
gain of 233 000 more jobs, thanks to the charges reduction. The firms also increase their
benefits.
However, it might me more efficient to target the policy on smaller wages. Therefore,
we vary the maximum wage to receive to policy, from 1.2 SMIC to 2.2 SMIC. The results
are displayed in the Table 1 below. It appeared that the 1.2 SMIC target gives the most
effective policy: smallest unemployment rate (9.55%), 298 000 more jobs, 253 000 less
unemployed and also the lowest costs.
Indicators 1.2 SMIC 1.3 SMIC 1.6 SMIC 2.2 SMIC
Unemployment rate (%) 9.55 9.66 9.78 9.83
Number of created jobs (in thousands) 298 266 233 217
Number of avoided unemployed (in thousands) 253 228 192 180
Gross cost per created jobs (in euros) 86138 94361 110 729 119 816
Gross cost per avoided unemployed (in euros) 101 581 110 088 134 375 144 445
Table 1: Charge Reductions. The baseline simulation corresponds to the 1.6 SMIC column
(in italics).
Firing costs and legal justification Another option to reduce unemployment would
be to ease the creation of OEC (instead of FTC). Many firm leaders and employers’
syndicate complain about the level of firing costs on one hand, and about the difficulty
to fire an employee when the demand becomes insufficient, on the other hand. Therefore
we conducted experiments to study these issues.
In a first experiment, we vary the level of firing costs, and multiply them by a factor
between 0 and 50. Surprisingly, we found a very small effect on unemployment. The
unemployment rate increase only by 1 point when we multiply the firing costs by 50.
When the cost increases, the firms replace OEC hirings by FTC hirings. Moreover, when
the cost is null, the unemployment remains around 9.5%, because hiring in OEC remain
low.
So, maybe this is not about the cost of firing, but about the difficulty to fire someone,
when the demand is low. Therefore, we conducted a second experiment, where we remove
the legal justification attached to firings. When it is the economic interest for the firm to
fact that workers are sent to unemployment frequently) is rather negative. It is very difficult to quantify these
effects. WorkSim is the first agent-based model to account for all these five effects. Our results for the FTC
removal could be explained by the fact that the reduction of churning is not large enough to compensate the
loss of buffer stock and stepping stone effects (for definitions and more details, see Goudet et al., 2014; Goudet,
2015).
22 As noted above, the baseline simulation is performed with parameters set to their calibrated values.
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fire an employee, it does so. Moreover, this possibility is integrated into the anticipation
mechanism that is part of the decision process to create an OEC job. The results are
shown in Table 2, after 2 years following the variant. With this variant, unemployment
rate drops by 1.62 points, and the decrease is particularly important for the youth, with
a drop of 10.67 points. However, we observe an increase of 1.64 for the seniors. When we
look at the unemployment rate per occupation, we find the variant to be quite beneficial
for the blue collars/employees category (-3.26 points) at the detriment of the two other
occupations (+0.75 for middle levels and +1.64 for executives). This could partly due to
the fact that the firms mainly use OEC to hire: the entry rate in OEC goes from 11.4
% to 27.24 %; while the entry rate in FTC drops from 45.38 % to 7.22 %. The share of
FTCs drops from 8.77 to 1.89 %. As a counterpart, the OEC become more precarious: the
economic firing rate increases from 0.58 % to 16.74 % and the average seniority in OEC
decreases from 5.86 to 3.55 years, and the probability to loose a job increases by 65 %
(from 8 % to 10.33 %). There is a also in individual utilities (well-being) of -1.3 points.
Indicators Reference Variante Impact
Unemployment rate (%) 9.81 8.19 -1.62***
Unemployment rate 15-24 ans (%) 24.66 13.99 -10.67***
Unemployment rate 25-49 ans (%) 8.89 7.65 -1.24***
Unemployment rate 50-64 ans (%) 5.42 7.06 +1.64***
Activity rate (%) 69.84 70.01 +0.17***
Number of employed individuals (in thousands) 25 694 26 1218 +523***
Number of unemployed individuals (in thousands) 2794 2340 -454***
Entry rate in OEC (%) 11.4 27.24 +15.84***
Entry rate in FTC (%) 45.38 7.22 -38.16***
Average individual’s utility 226.5 225.2 -1.3***
Average weekly firm benefit (in euros) 4133 4728 +595***
Long-term unemployment rate (%) 32.12 41.94 +9.81***
Economic firing rate (%) 0.58 16.74 +16.16***
Probability to loose one’s job within a year (%) 8 10.33 +2.33***
Table 2: Removal of legal justification in case of firing.
To sump up, this policy is not yet the ideal solution to improve employment nor well-
being: even it is costless and created 523 000 jobs in our simulation, that was at the price
of a significant higher precariousness. Moreover, in another simulation, we found that this
policy shows less resilience when the demand gets weaker.
Finally we present the most recent simulation we performed to evaluate the very recent
labor reform law in France.
4.3 Evaluation of the El Khomri Law
The El Khomri law project has been presented in March 2016 by the French government
as the major labor law of the F. Hollande’s presidency. This law has recently set the war
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not only on the French political scene, but also between French economists who do not
hesitate to take a categorical position in favor or against it. Its final version was voted on
July 21, 2016. There are many articles in the law, and several are impossible to model at
this stage. Here we focus on the facilitation of the economic dismissals, as it is likely to
have a most important impact on the labor market.
Before the law, the economic dismissals are allowed if the firm faces “serious economic
problems” which in our understanding of case law we interpret as losses over a period of
year which can lead to the failure of the firm. Judges may have their own interpretation
over the minimum level of losses which could lead to failure23.
With the ELK law, article 30 (denoted as “ELK law” in the remaining of this paper)),
the conditions to allow economic dismissals are explicitly specified. They will be allowed
in case of a decline either in firm’s demand or its turnover computed over a certain period,
which depends on the firm’s size. For firms under 11 employees, the period is 1 quarter,
for those between 11 and less than 50 the period is 2 quarters, for firms between 50 and
less than 300, the delay is 3 quarters, and for firms with 300 employees or more the delay
is 4 quarters.
Effects under a stable aggregate demand At first we simulate24 the ELK law for
a steady state of the exogenous aggregate demand. ELK law yields effects which change
over time after the introduction of the law. They evolve during the first 3 years to stabilize
generally after 4 years. The first can be termed short run effects and the latter long run
effects. This comes from the fact that it takes time for the firing conditions to be filled
even under the new law. The immense majority of French firms are small or very small
and it takes time for such firms to face a cumulated change large enough to be willing to
fire at least one employee.
The law is favorable to the young (15-24), both in the short and the long run, with
a decline in unemployment of 148,000 after 4 years (drop over 5 points). The impact
is not significant for the age class (25-49), after 2 years, there is a small decrease in
unemployment (-53,000) and an increase in employment (+71,000). However after 4 years
the law has no significant effect on this age class. Finally the seniors (50-65) undergo a
substantial rise in unemployment (+101,000), rising from 6.6 to 8%, i.e. 1.4 points, and a
decrease in employment (-121,000).
Moreover, the mobility on the labor market is found to change very deeply, and the
nature of the labor market is transformed. The share of FTCs in the hires falls from
77% to 30%. The OEC becomes the dominant hiring contract. The proportion of FTCs
in ongoing contracts falls from 8% to 2.3%, yet with a decrease of the mean duration
(renewal not included) from 3.6 weeks to 1.9 weeks, meaning that the FTCs are now used
only when future demand forecasts are bad and no training is required. The economic
dismissal rate jumps from 0.6% to 19%, a major change in a labor market characterized
by a very low and decreasing economic dismissal rate. As a consequence the OECs become
23 The minimum level is then not our arbitrary decision but calibrated simultaneously with the other parameters
of the model, and found as 28% of sales revenue in the reference simulation. The judge intervenes only if the
fired workers sue, which happens in 1% of cases. However the workers win in 64% of the litigations.
24 In these simulations, we use 2014 as a reference year for the calibration
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shorter (the median duration of OECs falls from 4.8 to 2 years) and more precarious, as
the probability to loose one’s job within a year jumps from 8.17 to 13.13 (+4.9 points, +
60 % relative increase).
Indicators Reference Variante Impact
Unemployment rate (%) 10.37 10.26 ns
Unemployment rate 15-24 yr (%) 27.75 21.89 -5.86***
Unemployment rate 25-49 yr (%) 9.1 9.24 ns
Unemployment rate 50-64 yr (%) 6.62 8.03 +1.41***
Activity rate (%) 59.29 59.09 -0.2**
Number of employed individuals (in thousands) 25 591 25681 ns
Number of unemployed individuals (in thousands) 2960 2937 ns
Entry rate in OEC (%) 11.88 28.24 +16.36***
Entry rate in FTC (%) 40.95 12.45 -28.51***
Average individual’s utility 229.2 222.72 -6.48***
Average weekly firm benefit (in euros) 4133 4728 +595***
Long-term unemployment rate (%) 34.72 33.26 -1.47***
Economic firing rate (%) 0.61 19.55 +18.94***
Probability to loose one’s OEC within a year (%) 8.17 13.13 +4.86***
Table 3: Results for ELK Law after 4 years. ns = non significant .
Two major conclusions can be drawn. First a significant substitution of the young to the
seniors takes place, although it declines with time. Second the new load of adjustment set
on the OECs has the logical effect of making the FTCs an almost useless tool of flexibility
for the employers except for very short expected durations. The explanation of the opposed
effects over the young versus the other categories is clear. The young were much more often
than the others in FTCs (22% against 7.6% for the 25-50 and 4.9% for the seniors) and
benefit from their fall. The effect then goes much beyond the higher flexibility of OECs.
It raises the integration of the young in (more precarious) OECs, and this shows that the
screening and experience enhancing roles of FTCs were not sufficient. This mechanism,
the substitution of OECs to FTCs, and its consequence, the substitution of young workers
to seniors, has been overlooked or greatly underestimated by non quantitative analysis of
the law.
Sensitivity of adjustment to aggregate demand We now change exogenously ag-
gregate demand in order to compare the effects on the unemployment rate of the firing
conditions before the law and after the law. Figure 4 gives values after 2 years. It shows
that the adjustment of the labor force is predicted to be more important after the law.
When demand declines under its value in the reference simulation, economic dismissals
are more important, the suppression of the hoarded labor is more complete, and unem-
ployment rises more under the law El-Khomri (increase between 4 and 12 points). When
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demand rises above the reference value, the employers hire more easily on OECs, and
unemployment decreases more under ELK law (decrease around 2 points). The responses
are not symmetric for large (and unrealistic) changes since if demand is very high, there
always remains some search unemployment by workers who take the time to find a job
which satisfies their reservation utility.
Fig. 4: Sensitivity of employment rate to demand shocks. x-axis displays the demand factor
df ∈ [0, 5; 2], where the total demand Dtot becomes df ×Dreftot
5 Discussion
In this paper, we present the WorkSim framework, a comprehensive model of the labor
market. It implements numerous mechanisms that were not integrated together before
within a single labor market model: both sides of the market, detailed decision processes
under bounded rationality, learning and anticipation, endogenous contract choices, human
capitals, endogenous salaries and productivities. The stock-flow accounting of individuals,
based on gross flows, is complete and endogenous. It can be supplemented by a stock-
flow accounting of jobs (and even jobs within the company) for further analysis. The
institutional environment is modeled and based on labor law, which sets constraints on
the possible decisions.
WorkSim is calibrated on a large number of targets of the French labor market, by using
a powerful algorithm which has not already been used in economic models. It reproduces
well enough these targets to conduct some economic analyses. Moreover, it reproduces
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well the gross flows measured by different statistical sources and with different types of
measures. This gives us an estimation of the model accuracy, and is part of the model’s
validation process.
We conducted several analyzes and policy evaluations. These helped us to identify core
mechanisms in the French Labor Market : segmentation, importance of firms’ pessimism,
among others. Labor policies appeared to have contrasting results in terms of employment
improvements, utilities, benefits and costs.
Future directions The model can be extended in several directions : adding temporary
employment agencies, social networks, and training (more detailed) for instance. We can
also integrate more organizational elements, including skills and tasks.
Second, WorkSim needs to be plugged into an agent-based macro-economical frame-
work, in order to have consumption, production and financial effects as well25 .
Third, tools to help analyzing and explaining the simulations are still to be developed
further : visualization (improving the graphical interface in WorkSim), analyses of the
agents ’ decisions, automatic classification of agents’ trajectories to study individuals’
careers (cohort analysis). Another issue is the link with econometrics, to improve the
agents’ micro-foundation and enhance the validation process.
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